Abstract. Recently, an answer-set programming (ASP) formalism of logic programing with the answer-set semantics has been extended to the full first-order setting. Earlier an extension of first-order logic with inductive definitions, the logic FO(ID), was proposed as a knowledge representation formalism and developed as an alternative ASP language. We present characterizations of these formalisms in terms of concepts of infinitary propositional logic. We use them to find a direct connection between the first-order ASP and the logic FO(ID) under some restrictions on the form of theories (programs) considered.
Introduction
Answer-set programming (ASP, for short) is a paradigm for modeling and solving search problems and their optimization variants. To model a search problem, one constructs a theory in some logic language so that once the theory is appended with an encoding of a problem instance, its models represent in some direct fashion solutions to that instance of the problem. The paradigm was first formulated in these terms by Marek and Truszczyński [14] and Niemelä [16] for the formalism of logic programming with the stable-model semantics by Gelfond and Lifschitz [10, 11] , a nonmonotonic knowledge representation formalism with informal roots in epistemic interpretations of the negation as failure and closely connected to the default logic by Reiter [20] . Logic programming with the stable-model semantics and its extensions with the semantics of answer sets [11] are to this day the most broadly used dialects of ASP.
These formalisms were originally introduced with the syntax limited to rules and the semantics restricted to Herbrand interpretations. Recently researchers have sought to address these limitations. In particular, Pearce and Valverde [19] introduced the quantified equilibrium logic. That logic is a first-order extension of the equilibrium logic by Pearce [18] , a propositional logic with the semantics of equilibrium models. For a class of theories that correspond to programs, equilibrium models and answer sets coincide and so, the quantified equilibrium logic is indeed a generalization of logic programming with the answer-set semantics to the full first-order setting. Ferraris, Lee and Lifschitz [8] , proposed an alternative approach within the language of second-order logic. They introduced an operator SM that assigns a second-order sentence to a first-order one (incidentally, the operator SM closely resembles the one used to define circumscription). For a first-order sentence F , Ferraris et al. [8] proposed models of SM [F ] as answer sets of F and showed that the concept generalizes that of an answer set of a propositional formula. They also proved that the semantics of sentences provided by answer sets coincides with that of the quantified equilibrium logic.
While papers on ASP often bring up the default negation operator in logic programming as the key element to its success as a modeling language, the fact is that in most applications the default negation not is used as if it were a classical one. Arguably, the main appeal of logic programming with the answer-set semantics as an ASP formalism comes from its capability to capture inductive definitions. The importance of inductive definitions for knowledge representation was argued by Denecker [1, 2] , who proposed an extension of the first-order logic with inductive definitions, the logic FO(ID), as a knowledge representation formalism. A version of that language can be used according to the ASP paradigm and there are fast tools to support that use of the logic FO(ID). 1 The semantics of definitions in the logic FO(ID) is given by the well-founded semantics extended to the case of arbitrary interpretations. As the well-founded and answerset semantics are related, the question arises about the relation between the first-order extensions of ASP that we discussed earlier and the logic FO(ID).
In this work we show a class of FO(ID) theories for which the relationship is quite direct. Under a simple translation of FO(ID) theories into programs, models of the FO(ID) theories in that class are precisely answer sets of the program resulting from the translation. In this way, we resolve in positive a conjecture by Vladimir Lifschitz 2 . We point out that a converse embedding is possible as well.
As the main technical device in our arguments we use characterizations of the firstorder ASP and FO(ID) in the infinitary propositional logic. They are based on extensions to the infinitary case of the notion of reduct [7] on the one hand, and of the algebraic approach to stable and well-founded semantics [4] of general programs on the other. For the class of theories that we call programs, the concept of the reduct can be extended in two ways. We use one of them as a bridge to the first-order ASP as developed by Pearce and Valverde [19] and Ferraris et al. [8] . We use the other as the connection to the logic FO(ID), and note here in passing that it also provides an alternative characterization of a version of the first-order ASP proposed by Denecker et al. [3] .
Stable models in infinitary propositional logic
Let A be a propositional signature, that is, a set of 0-ary relation symbols (or propositions). We assume the existence of a 0-ary predicate constant ⊥, different from all symbols in A, and define sets F 0 , F 1 , . . . by induction as follows:
A belongs to at least one set F i . We call the least index i of a set F i containing F the rank of F .
The primary connectives of the language are {} ∨ , {} ∧ and →. We define the boolean connectives ∧, ∨, ↔ and ¬ , as well as another 0-ary predicate constant , as shorthands: F ∨ G ::= {F, G} ∨ ; F ∧ G ::= {F, G} ∧ ; F ↔ G ::= (F → G) ∧ (G → F ); ¬F ::= F → ⊥; and ::= ¬⊥.
The standard semantics of propositional logic extends to the case of infinitary formulas. An interpretation of A is a subset of A (atoms in the subset are true and all the other ones are false). We denote the set of all interpretations of A by Int A . For an interpretation I of A, and an infinitary formula F , we define the relation I |= F by induction on the rank of a formula as follows:
The concept of the reduct proposed by Ferraris [7] for the standard propositional logic can be extended to sets of infinitary formulas. The inductive definition follows:
If F is a set of infinitary formulas, we define the reduct
A be a set of infinitary formulas. An interpretation I ∈ Int A is a stable model of F if I is a minimal model of F I .
The use of the term model in stable model is justified. That is, stable models are models. This is evident from the following more general property. If a set F of finitary formulas has no negative occurrences of variables, it has minimal models and each of these models is a stable model of the formula. This property does not hold in the case of infinitary formulas. Let
. ., and let F = {F 0 , F 1 , . . .} (we assume here that A = {p 0 , p 1 , . . .}). It is easy to see that there is no finite set M ⊆ A such that M |= F. On the other hand, every infinite set M ⊆ A is a model of F. It follows that F has no minimal models. It is also easy to show that F has no stable models.
Next, we extend the semantics of HT-interpretations to (sets of) infinitary formulas. Our goal is to extend the equilibrium logic [18] to the infinitary case and show that equilibrium models and stable models coincide. Definition 2. An HT-interpretation is a pair X, Y , where X, Y ∈ Int A and X ⊆ Y . The satisfiability relation |= ht is specified by induction as follows:
If X, Y |= ht F , then we say that X, Y is an HT-model of F . The concept of a model and the relation |= ht extend in a standard way to sets of infinitary formulas.
The following result gathers important properties of the relation |= ht . They extend the corresponding properties of that relation in the standard finitary setting [7, 9] . Theorem 1. For every formula F and every interpretations X, Y ∈ Int A such that X ⊆ Y we have:
The next result characterizes the relation |= ht in terms of the standard satisfiability relation and the reduct. 
Stable models in first-order logic
Let σ be a signature of a language of first-order logic and let U be a set. By σ U we denote the signature obtained by adding to σ distinct symbols u * (names) for every u ∈ U .
Next, let I be an interpretation of σ, that is, a structure comprising a non-empty domain, written as |I|, and for each relation and function symbol in σ, a relation or function on |I|, of the same arity, to interpret it. We denote by A σ,I the set of all those atomic formulas of the first order language L σ |I| that are built of relation symbols in σ and the names of elements in |I|. We identify an interpretation I of σ with its extension I to σ |I| defined by setting I (s) = I(s), for every s ∈ σ, and I (u * ) = u for every u ∈ |I|. From now on, we use the same symbol for an interpretation I of σ and for its (unique) extension to σ |I| defined above. We represent an interpretation I of σ (and its extension to σ |I| ) by a pair I f , I r , where I f is an interpretation of the part of σ (or equivalently, of σ |I| ) that consists of constant and function symbols in σ, and I r is a subset of A σ,I that describes in the obvious way the relations in I (the interpretation of new constants is determined and does not need to be explicitly represented). We write Int σ for the set of all interpretations of σ (extended as described above).
Let F be a sentence in the language L σ |I| . We define the relation I |= F following the approach used, for instance, by Doets [6] (the definition of the value t I of a term t in I is standard, we assume the reader is familiar with it):
Let I be an interpretation of σ and F be a sentence in L σ |I| . We define the grounding of F with respect to I, gr I (F ), as follows:
In addition, if F is a set of sentences from the language L σ |I| , we define gr I (F) = {gr I (F ) | F ∈ F}. It is clear that for every sentence F in L σ |I| , gr I (F ) is an infinitary propositional formula in the signature A σ,I . It is important to note that gr I (F ) depends only on I f and not on I r . There is a simple connection between the first-order satisfiability relation and the one we defined earlier for the infinitary propositional logic. Proposition 2. Let I be an interpretation of σ and F a sentence from L σ |I| . Then I |= F if and only if I r |= gr I (F ).
Proof. The basis of the induction is evident. For example, let us assume that F has the form t 1 = t 2 . By the definition, if I |= t 1 = t 2 then t
The inductive step is simple, too. For example, let us assume that F = ∀xG(x). By the definition, I |= F if and only if I |= G(u * ), for every u ∈ |I|. By the induction hypothesis (as F is a sentence, each G(u * ) is a sentence, too), this condition is equivalent to I r |= gr I (G(u * )), for all u ∈ |I| which, in turn, is equivalent to
Noting that {gr I (G(u * )) | u ∈ |I|} ∧ = gr I (F ) completes the argument. The other cases for F can be handled in a similar way.
2
With the notion of grounding in hand, we now define stable models of a set of first-order sentences.
Definition 3. Let σ be a signature. An interpretation I = I f , I r of σ is a stable model of a set F of sentences from L σ if I r is a stable model of gr I (F).
This concept of stability is well defined as formulas in gr I (F) are infinitary propositional formulas over the signature A σ,I and for every interpretation I of σ, I
r ⊆ A σ,I . By the definition of a stable model of a set of infinitary formulas over A σ,I we have the following direct characterization of stable models. Ferraris et al. [8] introduced an operator SM that assigns to each first-order sentence F (in signature σ) a second-order formula SM [F ] . The details of the definition are immaterial to our subsequent discussion and we omit them. Ferraris et al. defined an interpretation I ∈ Int σ to be a stable model of F if I is a model of SM [F ] . We show that our definition of stable models of a sentence is equivalent to the one based on the operator SM . We proceed in a roundabout way through a connection between our concept of stability and that based on the quantified logic here-and-there [19] .
Following Ferraris et al. [8] , we define an HT-interpretation of a first-order signature σ as a triple I = I f , I h , I t , where I f is an interpretation of the part of σ that consists of constant and function symbols, and I h and I t are subsets of A σ,I such that I h ⊆ I t . Moreover, we define the relation I |= ht F , where F is a sentence from L σ |I| , follows:
An HT-interpretation
h = I t , and for every proper subset X of I h , I f , X, I t |= ht F . Ferraris et al. [8] proved the following result.
Theorem 4 (Ferraris et al. [8] ). An HT-interpretation
The key step in showing that these two notions of stability coincide with the one we introduced in Definition 3 consists of showing that the first-order relation |= ht can be expressed in terms of the relation |= ht of the infinitary propositional logic. Proof. The basis of the induction is evident. For example, let us assume that F = p(t 1 , . . . , t k ). Then I |= ht F if and only if p((t
We now state and prove the result showing the equivalence of the three definitions of stable models of a first-order sentence. Proof. (1) and (2) are equivalent by Theorem 4. We will prove the equivalence of (2) and (3). Let I be an interpretation of σ such that I f , I r , I r is an equilibrium model of F . It follows that I f , I r , I r |= ht F and for every proper subset X of I r , I f , X, I r |= ht F . The first property and Proposition 4 imply that I r , I r |= ht gr I (F ). The second property and Proposition 4 imply that for every proper subset X of I r , X, I r |= ht gr I (F ). Thus, by Theorem 3, I is a stable model of gr I (F ) and, consequently, a stable model of F according to Definition 3.
Conversely, let us assume that I is a classical interpretation of σ such that I r is a stable model of gr I (F ). It follows (Theorem 3) that I r , I r |= ht gr I (F ) and there is no proper subset X of I r such that X, I r |= ht gr I (F ). Using Proposition 4, we obtain that I is an equilibrium model of F . 2
We note that the definitions of stable models of sentences given here and in terms of equilibrium models extend to infinite collections of sentences. The definition in terms of the operator SM does not lend itself in any obvious way to such an extension.
Programs
A program (in the language of the infinitary propositional logic) is a set of program clauses, that is, formulas F → p, where F ∈ L inf A and p ∈ A. For consistency with the standard logic programming notation, we write a clause F → p as p ← F . We call p the head of the clause p ← F .
Let Π be a program in the signature A. We denote by A The concept of an input stable model was introduced and studied by Lierler and Truszczynski [13] as the basis for the formalism SM(ASP). It is closely related to models of modular logic programming systems [12, 17, 3] .
Input stable models have an elegant direct characterization in terms of stable models that extends the corresponding characterization for the finitary case given by Lierler and Truszczynski [13] . Let Π be a program. We define Π in = Π ∪ {a ← ¬¬a | a ∈ A in }. The proof of the characterization below is similar to the one for the finitary case and we omit it. For programs one can introduce an alternative notion of a reduct. Let F ∈ L inf A and I ∈ Int A . We define F I to be the formula obtained by replacing each atom p that occurs negatively in F with ⊥, if I |= p, and with , otherwise. 5 For a program Π, we define
We note that formulas F I have only positive occurrences of atoms. Thus, for any two interpretations J, J ∈ Int A such that J ⊆ J , if J |= F I then J |= F I . In particular, it follows that for every program Π and every interpretation I, Π I has a least model denoted by LM (Π I ). This observation gives rise to the notion of an ID-stable model of a program. We introduce it below, together with the related notion of an input ID-stable model. It is clear that I |= Π if and only if I |= Π I . Thus, ID-stable models of Π are models of Π and the use of the term "model" in "ID-stable model" (and so, also in "input ID-stable model") is justified.
In general, stable models and ID-stable models of programs do not coincide. For instance, let Π = {p ← ¬¬p}. One can check that I = ∅ and J = {p} are stable models of Π. On the other hand, since p occurs positively in Π, Π I = Π J = Π. The least model of Π is ∅. Thus, I is an ID-stable model of Π but J is not!
We will now show a class of programs for which the two concepts coincide. Let N be the set of all formulas F that satisfy the following property: every occurrence of the reduces in a simple way to the one we consider. One just needs to extend Π with rules of the form a ← ⊥, for every a ∈ A out Π that is not the head of any rule in Π. 5 The only connectives in the language are {·} ∨ (generalized ∨), {·} ∧ (generalized ∧), and →. Thus, the notions of a positive and negative occurrence of a propositional atom in a formula are well defined.
implication in F has ⊥ as the consequent and no occurrence of implication in its antecedent. The first requirement says that all occurrences of the implication operator can be replaced with the negation operator, the second requirement says that the negation operator cannot be nested. Lemma 1. Let Π be a program in signature A and I an interpretation of A such that
Thus the assertion follows.
Lemma 2. For every formula F ∈ N , and every interpretation I, F I and F I have the same models contained in I.
Proof. The proof is by induction on the rank of a formula. If F = ⊥, then F I = ⊥ = F I and the claim is evident. If F = p, and I |= p, then p I = p and p I = p. If I |= p, then p I = ⊥ and p I = p. In each case, the formulas p I and p I have the same models that are subsets of I.
For the inductive step there are several cases to consider. First, let us assume that F = H ∨ . If I |= F , F I = ⊥ and it has no models contained in I. Moreover, for every G ∈ H, I |= G. By the induction hypothesis, the formulas G I and G I have the same models contained in I. Since G I = ⊥, no G I has models contained in I and, consequently, F I = {G I | G ∈ H} ∨ has no models contained in I. Thus, let us assume that I |= F . It follows that (H ∨ ) I = {G I | G ∈ H} ∨ and (H ∨ ) I = {G I | G ∈ H} ∨ . By the induction hypothesis, for every G ∈ H, G I and G I have the same models contained in I. Thus, (H ∨ ) I and (H ∨ ) I have that property, too. The argument for the case F = H ∧ is similar. So, let us assume that F = G → ⊥. Since F ∈ N , G has no occurrences of implication and, consequently, all occurrences of atoms in G are negative in F . It follows that if I |= G then F I ≡ ⊥ → ⊥ ≡ and, otherwise (if
Similarly, if I |= G then I |= F and, consequently, F I = ⊥. Thus, also in this case F I ≡ F I and the assertion follows. 2 Theorem 6. Let Π be a program such that for every clause p ← G ∈ Π, G ∈ N . Then stable and ID-stable models of Π coincide, and input stable and input ID-stable models coincide.
Proof. Reasoning in each direction we have that I is a model of Π. By Lemmas 1 and 2, Π I and Π I have the same models contained in I. Thus, if I is the least model of Π I , I is the least model (and, in particular, a minimal model) of Π I . Conversely, if I is a minimal model of Π I , then I is a minimal model of Π I and so, the least model of Π I . These two observations imply the first part of the assertion. The second part follows from the first part and from the definitions. 2
The discussion above extends in a straightforward way to the first-order case. Let us consider a first-order signature σ. A program clause is a formula ∀X (G → p(t)), where t is a tuple of terms of the arity equal to the arity of p, and X is a tuple of all free variables in G → p(t). A program is a collection of clauses. As before, we write a clause ∀X (G → p(t)) as ∀X (p(t) ← G) or even as p(t) ← G.
First, we generalize to the first-order setting the results concerning input stable models.
Definition 6. Let Π be a program in a first-order signature σ. An interpretation I ∈ Int σ is an input stable model of Π if I r is an input stable model of gr I (Π).
For a program Π in a first-order signature σ, we define σ out Π to be the set of all relation symbols occurring in the heads of clauses in Π and σ in Π to be the set of all other relation symbols in Π. Whenever there is no ambiguity, we drop Π from the notation. We set
We have the following result, which can be obtained by lifting through grounding the corresponding result from the infinitary propositional setting (Proposition 5). The concepts of ID-stable and input ID-stable models can similarly be lifted to the first-order setting.
Definition 7.
If Π is a program in a first-order signature σ, an interpretation I ∈ Int σ is an (input) ID-stable model of Π if I r is an (input) ID-stable model of gr I (Π).
The definition of the class N extends literally to the first-order language. We define the class N fo to consist of all first-order formulas F such that every occurrence of → in F has ⊥ in its consequent and no occurrence of → in its antecedent (elements of N fo may contain free variables). Since grounding formulas form N fo results in infinitary propositional formulas from N , Theorem 6 lifts to the first-order setting.
Theorem 8. Let Π be a program over a first-order signature σ such that for every clause p(t) ← G ∈ Π, G ∈ N fo . Then (input) stable and (input) ID-stable models of Π coincide.
Logics PC(ID) and FO(ID)
We now consider the logic FO(ID) introduced by Denecker [2] and investigated in detail by Denecker and Ternovska [5] . Our goal is to relate that logic to the formalism of firstorder programs under the stable model semantics. To this end, we first relate the logic FO(ID) with the logic of (first-order) programs under the semantics of ID-stable models. Next, we apply Theorem 8 to obtain the result we are interested in.
We start by extending the logic PC(ID), the propositional version of FO(ID), to the infinitary propositional case. Our approach consists of a straightforward extension to the infinitary setting of the algebraic approach developed by Denecker et al. [4] .
Let A be a propositional signature and Π a program in L inf A . The Fitting operator for Π, Φ Π : Int A × Int A → Int A , is defined by
The key monotonicity properties of the operator Φ Π in the finitary setting extend in a direct way to the infinitary one.
Proposition 6. For every program Π, the operator Φ Π is monotone in the first argument and antimonotone in the second.
We recall that for a program Π in the signature A we write A out Π for the set of all atoms that appear in the heads of clauses in Π and A in Π for A \ A out Π . We also omit Π from the notation whenever it is clear from the context.
For every interpretation K ∈ Int A in , we set Int A,K = {I ∈ Int A | I ∩ A in = K}. Given a program Π and an interpretation K ∈ Int A in , we define the Fitting operator
where I, J ∈ Int A,K . The operator Φ Π,K is well defined, that is, to every pair of interpretations from Int A,K it assigns an interpretation from Int A,K . It is easy to see that for every I, J ∈ Int A (= Int A,∅ ), Φ Π,∅ (I, J) = Φ Π (I, J). Moreover, by the previous result, Φ Π,K is monotone in the first argument and antimonotone in the second. Definition 8. Let Π be a program in signature A and K ∈ Int A in an interpretation. The stable operator with input K, St Π,K : Int A,K → Int A,K , is defined by
We note that input ID-stable models that we introduced in the previous section can be characterized in terms of the operator St Π,K . The operator St Π,K is a stepping stone to the fundamental concept of the logic PC(ID): the well-founded model based on an interpretation of input atoms. To introduce it, we define an operator W Π,K on Int A,K × Int A,K by setting:
By Proposition 6 and the definitions of the operators Φ Π,K and St Π,K , for every K ∈ Int A in the operator St Π,K is antimonotone. It follows that the operator W Π,K is monotone with respect to the precision order ≤ P defined as follows:
(I, J) ≤ P (I , J ) if and only if I ⊆ I and J ⊆ J.
The precision order is a partial order that imposes on Int A,K × Int A,K the structure of a complete lattice, with the pair (K, A) as its least element. By the Tarski-Knaster theorem, W Π,K has a least fixpoint, and this fixpoint is the limit of the transfinite sequence {W Let us assume that (I 0 , J 0 ) is that limit. Then, we have I 0 ⊆ J 0 and
It follows that I 0 = St Π,K (J 0 ) and I 0 ⊆ St Π,K (I 0 ). We call the pair (I 0 , St Π,K (I 0 )) the well-founded model of Π based on input K. 6 Atoms in I 0 are true in the model and those not in St Π,K (I 0 ) are false. All the other atoms are unknown. If I 0 = St Π,K (I 0 ), then we call the well-founded model total, as no atoms are unknown in it.
Before we proceed, we note two results generalizing well-known properties of stable and well-founded models of standard finitary programs to the present setting. The first one states that the well-founded model of Π based on input K approximates all input ID-stable models of Π such that I ∩ A in = K. The second one relates total well-founded and stable models. The well-founded models based on a specified input form the basis of the logic PC(ID). We introduce this logic here in a form adapted to the infinitary setting. One can define a PC(ID) theory as consisting of a propositional theory in L inf A and a set of programs. The concept of an ID-model extends directly to that more general setting. However, all salient features of the logic PC(ID) are captured by theories with a single program (cf. Denecker et al. [15] ), which is the reason for the restriction we adopted.
A program Π in a signature A is total if for every K ∈ Int A in , the well-founded model of Π based on the input K is total. Total programs are also called definitions. A PC(ID) theory is total if its program is total. PC(ID) theories that arise naturally in knowledge representation applications are total. From now on we focus on total PC(ID) theories and study the connection between the concepts of ID-models and ID-stable models.
To this end, we extend the class of programs we consider. Namely, we allow programs to contain constraints, that is, clauses of the form ⊥ ← ϕ, where ϕ ∈ L inf A . Definition 10. Let Π be an infinitary program in a signature A and let Π and Π consist of all non-constraint and constraint clauses in Π, respectively. An interpretation I is an input ID-stable model of Π if I is an input ID-stable model of Π and a model of Π Remark. Constraints can also be handled directly in the language of programs as we introduced them earlier. Let Π be a program (without constraints). An atom f such that every clause in Π with f in the head is of the form f ← ϕ ∧ ¬f is an effective contradiction for Π. Clauses in Π with heads that are effective contradictions for Π are called effective constraints in Π. Here, as in the finitary case, effective constraints work as constraints. Specifically, let Π be a program without constraints (but, possibly, with effective constraints), and let Π be a program with constraints obtained from Π by replacing each effective constraint f ← ϕ ∧ ¬f with the constraint ⊥ ← ϕ. One can show that an interpretation I ∈ Int A is an input ID-stable model of Π if and only if I is an input ID-stable model of Π according to Definition 10.
Let F ⊆ L inf
A . Formulas in F can be written as constraints. Namely, we define
It is clear that F and F ← have the same models (are equivalent). We have the following connection between total PC(ID) theories and programs with constraints. Proof. Let I be an ID-model of (F, Π). Then I is a model of F , and (I, I) is the well-founded model of Π based on the input I ∩ A in . By Proposition 9, I is an input ID-stable model of Π. By Definition 10, I is an input ID-stable model of Π ∪ F ← . Conversely, let I be an input ID-stable model of Π ∪ F ← . By Definition 10, I is a model of F and an input ID-stable model of Π. Let (I 0 , J 0 ) be the well-founded model of Π based on input I ∩ A in . By Proposition 8, I 0 ⊆ I ⊆ J 0 . Since Π is total, I 0 = J 0 and so, (I, I) is the well-founded model of Π based on input I ∩ A in . Thus, I is an ID-model of (F, Π).
Input stable and input ID-stable models coincide for the class of programs whose rules have formulas from N as their bodies (Theorem 6). Under the restriction to that class of programs, Theorem 9 implies the following connection between ID-models of PC(ID) theories and stable models of infinitary programs.
Theorem 10. Let F ⊆ L inf
A and Π be a definition (without constraints) in A such that for every clause p ← G ∈ Π, G ∈ N . Then an interpretation I is an ID-model for (F, Π) if and only if I is a stable model of Π in ∪ F ← .
